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ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the Somali population
in Uganda. This spike reﬂects a new development in the history of
Somali mobility in East Africa, shaped both by crises and by
opportunities, from which sophisticated transnational and
translocal strategies have emerged. In this article, we draw
attention to these strategies to understand continuity and change
in Somali migrant networks in Kampala, highlighting the dual
signiﬁcance of Uganda both as a safe haven and as a stepping
stone for upward social mobility and business expansion across
the region and beyond. By describing the entanglement of needs
and aspirations driving the mobility and livelihood strategies of
Somali refugees, students and entrepreneurs, we argue that the
historical trajectory of the Somali community in Uganda over the
past 30 years has been shaped by the interaction of pre-existing
linkages and an institutional framework deﬁned by a mix of
donor-oriented policies and presidential patronage. We identify
three moments in which Museveni’s ability to ‘manage donors’
perceptions’ has had implications for the economic, demographic
and political conﬁguration of the Somali diaspora in Uganda: the
economic liberalisation of the 1990s; the 2006 Refugee Act; and
the 2007 deployment of UPDF in Uganda.
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On 11 July 2010, 74 people were killed as bombs ripped through two venues in Uganda’s
capital Kampala where football fans had gathered to watch the World Cup Finals.1 The
attacks were soon claimed by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, better known as Al-
Shabaab, a Somali Islamist armed group. The militants had confronted the Ugandan
People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in Somalia since Ugandan troops were ﬁrst deployed
there in May 2007 as part of the African Union (AU) Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)
to support the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG). It
was not the ﬁrst strike Al-Shabaab had carried out on Ugandan soil, but the impact of
the World Cup bombing was maximised by both its death toll and its timing. The
bloodshed occurred two weeks before the opening of an AU summit in a venue in
Kampala not far from where the bombs went oﬀ.2 Following the attacks, Ugandan and
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international media put the spotlight on Kisenyi, an area of the Ugandan capital known as
Little Mogadishu because of its high concentration of Somali-owned businesses. In media
reports, Kisenyi residents aired concerns of racial proﬁling and collective punishment.3
However, Ugandan oﬃcials carefully avoided to conﬂate security and refugee issues,
with President Yoweri Museveni personally reaﬃrming both his country’s open-door
policy and the commitment to defeating Al-Shabaab in Somalia.4
The 2010 terror attacks did not stem the Somali ﬂows to Uganda. On the contrary, the
Somali presence in the country has continued to grow at a steady pace ever since. Accord-
ing to Uganda’s Oﬃce of the Prime Minister (OPM), between 2008 and 2017 the number
of registered Somali refugees in the country soared from 8239 to 41,234, with 43% of the
total registered in Kampala and the rest in Nakivale refugee settlement.5 This ﬁgure does
not account for Somalis with passports – foreign or Somali – based in or regularly travel-
ling to Uganda. This increase coincided with the deterioration of the security situation of
Somalis in neighbouring Kenya, the main recipient of Somali refugees and home to a size-
able Kenyan Somali population, but did not represent a radical shift in the epicentre of the
Somali diaspora in East Africa, which remained in Kenya. In fact, the spike in the Somali
population in Uganda reﬂects a new development in the history of Somali mobility in East
Africa, shaped by both crises and opportunities and from which sophisticated transna-
tional and translocal strategies have emerged.
In this article, we draw attention to these strategies to understand continuity and
change in Somali migrant networks in Kampala, highlighting the dual signiﬁcance of
Uganda as both a safe haven and a stepping stone for upward social mobility and business
expansion across the region and beyond. We argue that the historical trajectory of the
Somali community in Uganda over the past thirty years has been shaped by the interaction
of pre-existing linkages and an institutional framework deﬁned by a mix of donor-oriented
policies and presidential patronage. Somali transnational networks in Uganda have con-
solidated and expanded in a setting in which Somali entrepreneurs with access to capitals
have been able to take advantages of business opportunities, drawing from a growing
number of trusted workforce and eventually forging synergies with the Ugandan security
apparatus.
We identify three moments in which Museveni’s ability to ‘manage donors’ percep-
tions’6 has had implications for the economic, demographic and political conﬁguration
of the Somali diaspora in Uganda: the economic liberalisation of the 1990s; the 2006
Refugee Act; and the 2007 deployment of UPDF in Uganda. Against an institutional back-
drop strongly inﬂuenced by the personalist style of government of Museveni, we thus
describe the entanglement of needs and aspirations driving the mobility and livelihood
strategies of Somali refugees, students and entrepreneurs. We also suggest that the
freedom of movement, within the country and across the border, aﬀorded by the
Ugandan refugee law has been a major pull factor for young refugees.
This article engages with the literature on African diasporas in Africa and on Somali
capitalist networks, taking stock of the complexity of intra-African migratory ﬂows.7 It
addresses the ‘complex intertwining of cultural institutions, social agency and political
authority’8 that sheds light on how diasporic networks emerge, consolidate and adapt
to a changing scenario. In doing so, we embrace a framework that integrates the insti-
tutional practices embedded in particular networks; the strategies used to restructure
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networks in response to changing circumstances and informing both power and solidarity
relationships; and the role of institutional interactions in shaping networks’ organisation.9
The data on which this article is based were collected in Kampala, Nairobi, and Har-
geisa, Somaliland in two separate spells between 2013 and 2015. During a total of 5
months, we interviewed 40 Somali entrepreneurs, workers in various Somali and non-
Somali-owned businesses, and students with diﬀerent legal status (refugees, Ugandan
nationals and passport holders from Somalia, Kenyan and other countries).
We begin by reviewing the current scholarship on Somali mobility in Africa, identifying
the gaps we want to address in this article. We then provide an historical overview of the
Somali diaspora in Uganda since colonial times and through Independence, until the
implosion of Somalia. The next section delves into three major turning points in the tra-
jectory of the Somali community in Uganda: the economic liberalisation policies of the
1990s, the approval of the 2006 Refugee Act and the deployment of UPDF troops to
Somalia in 2007. We then discuss the emergence of synergies between Ugandan security
and Somali diaspora associations and trace the transformations brought about to Kisenyi
by the growing inﬂux of Somali refugees. The following section focusses on the changing
demography of the Somali community in Uganda and on the rise of Somali youth popu-
lation in Kampala. We then examine the development of trading linkages between Kam-
pala’s and Nairobi’s Little Mogadishu and eventually look at Somali business networks
radiating from Uganda and across East and Central Africa.
Reviewing Somali mobility in East Africa
Despite an enduring academic tendency to focus on African diasporas outside of Africa at
the expense of the ones within Africa,10 recent years have seen empirical and theoretical
strides addressing this bias. A number of contributions have traced the formation of dia-
sporic identities and the development of transnational practices in African cities, empha-
sising contextual peculiarities. These diﬀerences aﬀect how migrants interact with local
populations and institutions, eke out a living, cultivate social mobility aspirations and
negotiate their sense of belonging with the need to embrace, at least tactically, cosmopo-
litan discourses.11 For instance, while the diasporic experience of Somalis, Zimbabweans
and Mozambicans in South Africa stand against a background characterised by xenopho-
bic tensions stemming from economic insecurity,12 ethnographies of Malians in Senegal
and Congo Brazzaville illustrate the transformations of economic ties in less fraught con-
texts.13 In general, there is an agreement on the fact that migrant networks are shaped by
the contours of the local political and economic landscape, as Bakewell and Binaisa suggest
in their study of Nigerian, Malian and Somali migrants in Lusaka, Zambia, and Kampala.14
These studies have also identiﬁed common patterns, starting with the role of pioneer
migrants in helping family members aﬀord the journey and the initial phase of resettle-
ment and the search for a job while beneﬁtting from the ‘supply of “trustworthy”
labour’.15 As businesses initially catering to an ethnic market branch out, new opportu-
nities attract more diverse typologies of migrants. Transnational exchanges intensify,
with the deployment of multi-site strategies.16 These dynamics often lead to the emergence
of migration hubs, ‘location-speciﬁc forms of social capital’.17 Here, a migration industry,
made of hospitality structures, money transfer operators, travel agencies and forged iden-
tity papers brokers, develops.18 Recent works on displacement economies19 and refugee
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economies20 have shown how social capital and access to ﬁnancial resources allow some
groups of migrants not only to better cope with volatility, but also to turn crises into
sources of opportunities. There are thus processes of social stratiﬁcation at work in
migrant networks, which, although understudied, are key to understand mobility patterns
and decision making.
The Somali diaspora has enjoyed more attention than any other African diaspora in
Africa, mostly because it maps, at the same time, onto issues of protracted displacement,
migrant capitalism, transnationalism, state security and, in Kenya, citizenship.21 However,
there are two main gaps in the existing literature on Somali migrant networks in Africa,
which this article seeks to address. The ﬁrst one is geographical. Most studies focus on
Kenya and South Africa. Because of its porous border with Somalia and its large popu-
lation of ethnic Somali citizens, Kenya has been the country most exposed to the repeated
mass displacement crises that have followed the collapse of the Somali State in 1991.22 Eth-
nographies of humanitarian spaces, such as Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, and
Nairobi Eastleigh’s estate, commonly known as Little Mogadishu, have extensively
explored the human infrastructure through which trust relationships are reproduced
and translated into business partnerships and support networks.23 Similar dynamics,
although on a smaller scale, are observed in South Africa, where Somali entrepreneurs
have occupied risky market niches in the post-Apartheid economy.24 The second gap
refers to the institutional and social context in which Somali networks are embedded. In
Kenya, the relationship of the Somali population vis-à-vis the state is deﬁned by the
legacy of the irredentist insurgency that broke out after Independence in the mostly
Somali-inhabited north-east of the country and by current state security anxieties due to
Kenyan armed intervention in Somalia.25 A view of Kenyan Somalis as a ﬁfth column
has imbued the public discourse on ethnic Somalis at large, shaping policies and practices
in both humanitarian spaces and cities26 and rendering Somali refugees particularly vul-
nerable to harassments by security forces. In South Africa, xenophobia and crime
mostly frame the Somali experience, forcing migrants to navigate an insecure environment
where they are likely target of violence. The Somali community in Kampala has ﬁgured in
studies on consumption of khat, a mild stimulant popular in the Horn of Africa27 and dia-
sporic identiﬁcation,28 but remains an understudied subject. Demography and lack of
shared borders with Somalia lay at the roots of the diverging historical trajectories of
state-diaspora relations in Kenya and Uganda. Also, unlike in South Africa, Somali
networks in Uganda have thrived in a political context which is mostly the by-product
of a personalised presidential engagement with groups endowed with economic and pol-
itical capital,29 coupled with the appeasement to international donors
The next section will trace the genesis of the Somali community in Uganda.
Askaris, pioneers, refugees
Although the past twenty years have seen an intensiﬁcation of outward migrations from
the Somali territories, the development of Somali migrant networks across East Africa
actually predates the outbreak of the civil war.30 The Somali presence in Uganda traces
back to the early 1900s, when Somali askaris from Northern Somalia serving in the
British Colonial Army settled in the surroundings of Jinja and Tororo with their families.
Mostly engaged in small trade and hauling across the Kenyan border, this small
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community of veterans preserved cultural and commercial ties to Somalia.31 While in
Kenya irredentist tensions between the central government and Somali pastoralists in
the North East of the country escalated into a 5-year-long insurgency, Somalis in
Uganda enjoyed a relationship of benign neglect vis-à-vis the state, carving an inconspic-
uous socio-economic niche for themselves on the margin of Uganda’s post-colonial polity.
In the 1970s, Sheikh Abdiwali, a Imam from Puntland, started raising funds among Somali
oil workers in the Gulf States32 for the construction of a large mosque in Kisenyi, at the
time a shabby and ill-famed area of Kampala’s Mengo neighbourhood, mostly inhabited
by menial workers at the nearby Owino market.33 Leveraging his prestige and linkages to
Northern Somalia, Sheikh Abdiwali was able to funnel Somali capitals to Uganda, where
former Somali oil workers invested in small commercial enterprises. These businesses
expanded during the 1980s, when, driven by foreboding, Somali entrepreneurs stepped
up investments in transport and fuel distribution by opening oﬃces in Kampala and
Jinja34 and creating agent networks in strategic locations such as Ariwara, a market
town right across the Zairian border and a gateway to Sudan.35 During this period, the
patriarchs of what would become successful Somali Ugandan capitalist families, such as
Ahmed Omar Mandela and Hussein Shire, consolidated their businesses. The former
started with a car and truck spare parts shop before establishing the Mandela Group,
the parent company of the City Oil distribution network and of eight subsidiaries with
operations in Kenya and Uganda. The latter gradually expanded a family-run shuttling
service between Tororo and Malaba, on the Kenyan border, into a 100-bus ﬂeet bus
company, Gateway Bus, ﬁnally branching out into fuel transportation and distribution
(Shire Petroleum), convenience stores (Hussein Stores), sugar production and real
estate development.36 The signiﬁcance of these Somali-owned transport businesses for
the Somali population not only in Uganda, but also in the broader region, was made
plain in 1989, when Gateway buses shuttled to Uganda almost 15,000 Kenyan Somalis
ﬂeeing a screening exercise rolled out by the government of President Daniel Arap Moi
to determine citizenship status. Uganda granted these Kenyan Somalis temporary political
asylum until 1991, when most of them returned to Kenya.37
In the same year, the collapse of the Somali state triggered a mass refugee crisis in the
region. Between 1991 and 1994, over 400,000 displaced Somalis sought shelter across the
Kenyan border ﬂeeing the outbreak of large-scale violence at home. Most refugees settled
in Kenya, where the Kenyan government ultimately adopted an ‘abdication and contain-
ment’ policy38 ordering refugees to reside in camps.39 Only a minority continued the
journey to Uganda. Both in Kenya and Uganda, the existence of transnational and trans-
local connections40 allowed those who could rely on diasporic linkages to move directly to
urban areas, such as Nairobi’s Eastleigh estate, while the others were forced to depend on
humanitarian aid. In 1994, the Ugandan government allowed the UNHCR to settle
recently arrived Somali refugees in Nakivale refugee camp, excluding urban centres.41
Most refugees from the Darood Harti and Isaaq clans, historically rooted in Northern
Somalia and linked to the pioneers who ﬁrst arrived in Uganda during colonial times,
used their connections and resources to settle in Kampala and Jinja while retaining
their registration in Nakivale (at the time, resettlement to a third country was only possible
via registration at a refugee camp). That same year, Sheikh Abdiweli inaugurated a larger
mosque with an annexed madrasa in Kisenyi, further establishing the reputation of the
neighbourhood as Kampala’s ‘Little Mogadishu’.42 However, while in Kenya, the presence
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of a large Somali Kenyan population, and a steady stream of Somali capitals, boosted local
Somali businesses, as it was evident through the momentous ‘malling’ of Eastleigh, which
attracted customers from all across Kenya and beyond,43 in Uganda the Somali commu-
nity grew at a much slower pace. Daily bus connections between Eastleigh and Kisenyi sus-
tained a Somali refugee community earning a living by trading a range of goods, from
camel milk to clothes, within their own ethnic market. Over the next two decades,
though, this market transformed under the combined eﬀect of regional dynamics and
national policy decisions. These turning points will be discussed in the next section.
Turning points
In the early 1990s, as Somalia imploded, Uganda was consolidating its reputation as an
international donors’ pet in the region. In exchange for economic assistance (IFI and bilat-
eral donors transferred to the country around USD 500 million per year between 1992 and
1998), Museveni’s government launched a series of measures to liberalise the economy and
attract investors.44 Although controversial because of widespread mismanagement and
corruption,45 the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and assets created investment
opportunities for businesspeople with capitals. At the beginning of the 1990s, Sheikh
Abdiwali had opened the ﬁrst branch of Amal, a money transfer operator from Puntland,
in Kisenyi, allowing resourceful Somali businessmen to funnel capitals to Uganda to invest
in capital intensive businesses. Somali entrepreneurs ﬂeeing the war at home and with lin-
kages to Ugandan Somalis promptly seized these opportunities, investing in capital-inten-
sive businesses with high growth potential, such as fuel supply, distribution, hospitality
and real estate. Among the most prominent of these successful businesspeople was
Amina Moghe Hersi, a Kenyan Somali who built a portfolio of several multi-million-
dollar investments in Kampala and across the country spanning shopping malls, super-
markets and luxury apartments.
Although the introduction of the East African passport in 1999 eased border crossing
for East African citizens, facilitating the transit of suitcase traders from Eastleigh, the high
fees of commercial licenses restricted the number of those able to rent a shop. Throughout
the 2000s, given the limited employment possibilities for Somali refugees with no external
support, Uganda continued to attract mostly refugees with connections. In 2006, the
Ugandan parliament approved a new Refugees Act. Ugandan MPs thus repealed the pre-
vious Control of Alien Refugees Act (CARA), criticised as ‘oppressive and archaic’46 by
national and international advocacy organisation and including provisions that restricted
refugees’ movements.47 The debate leading to the new law took stock of the speciﬁc geo-
politics of Uganda, since long at the centre of a major region of displacement.48,49 Praised
by international donors, the new Refugee Law embraced a development-based approach
promoting the ‘self-reliance’ of refugees, granting rights ‘to an identity card or travel docu-
ment, to remain, to non-discrimination, to administrative assistance, to freedom of reli-
gion, to freedom of association, to access the courts, and to freedom of movement.50
Moreover, the law recognised rights to own and transfer assets, to public higher education,
to work and own commercial activities, and to join or create non-political and non-proﬁt
associations and trade unions.
The approval of the new refugee law coincided with fresh mass displacements from
Somalia, triggered by the US-backed Ethiopian invasion against al-Itihaad al-Mahaakim
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al-Islaamiyya (Islamic Courts Union – ICU) and the rise of Al-Shabaab as a leading mili-
tant group. A month after the AU authorised AMISOM in January 2007, Uganda’s parlia-
ment approved the dispatch of troops to Somalia and, in early March, 1600 UPDF units
arrived in Mogadishu. Museveni government’s commitment stemmed from a combi-
nation of factors, including attracting Western donors’ military aid,51 boosting its image
abroad as a stalwart partner against terrorism in the region52 and leveraging its leading
role in AMISOM to counter international criticisms. Until November of that same year,
Uganda remained the only troops contributing country to AMISOM.53 This commitment,
however, came at a cost. On 7 November 2008, following threats from Al-Shabaab, a bomb
detonated in Kisenyi, killing two.54 This event drew media attention to the local Somali
community, raising questions on the risks that a growing inﬂux of refugees from
Somalia might pose to Uganda.
Reaching out
For the ﬁrst time, Ugandan security reached out to Somali refugee leaders and elders,
mostly residing in the hotels clustered around the Kisenyi mosque and hailing from
Darood Ogaden groups from South-Central Somalia. These notables used their contacts
in Southern Somalia, where UPDF were deployed, to position themselves as an interlocu-
tor of the government, and formed an organisation, the Somali Community Association in
Uganda (SCAU). Led by a council of eleven elders, the organisation was outspoken in sup-
porting the government’s policy in Uganda and UPDF in Somalia, as the chairman
Hussein Hassan Hariire made clear in several occasions.55 In October 2009, after fresh
threats from Al Shabaab, during a public meeting with Somali elders, Hariire was
adamant in acknowledging that any attack on Ugandan soil would have repercussions
on the Somali community as a whole and renewed the pledge ‘to stop these terrorists
from entering the country’.56 SCAU liaised with Ugandan intelligence and security ser-
vices to screen Somalis crossing the border from Kenya at the Ugandan ports of entry
of Busia and Malabo as they arrived in Kisenyi.57 Somalis previously registered as refugees
in Kenya were required to declare their status to the border authorities and register within
30 days to the Old Kampala police station or at the Oﬃce of the Prime Minister’s Depart-
ment of Refugee Aﬀairs. Initially, the refugees were allowed to reside in a city only if they
had a sponsor; otherwise they would be referred to Nakivale refugee camp. However, this
provision was dropped after a few months. SCAU played both a support and advocacy role
for Somalis arriving in Kampala, collaborated with the Ugandan city authorities and police
to solve disputes between refugees and Ugandans in the area and conveyed oﬃcial com-
munications to the Somali community (such as during the national census, when the
SCAU chairperson mobilised Somalis in Kisenyi and all over Uganda to collaborate).58
While using a network of informants in Somalia to warn Ugandan intelligence of possible
attacks to UPDF troops, SCAU helped members of the local community to get jobs as ‘cul-
tural awareness consultants’ for training courses aimed at Ugandan troops being deployed
in Somalia and funded by the US Embassy in Uganda.59
The SCAU successfully leveraged its capacity to collect intelligence both in Uganda and
in Somalia on potential threats to Ugandan civilian and military targets. At the same time,
it became the public face of the Somali support for Uganda’s leading role in AMISOM. For
instance, in November 2012, Uganda threatened to pull its troops out of Somalia in
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retaliation for a UN report that claimed that its government was supporting the M23 rebel
group in the DRC. In the following days, the Ugandan media reported the concern of
Somali refugees in the country – particularly those aﬃliated to the SCAU – over this
possibility.
The gatekeeping role of SCAU was, however, not undisputed. In order to consolidate its
position as the voice of the Somali community, SCAU leaders fended oﬀ competition from
rival Somali organisations, including the Somali Embassy. This power struggle drew public
attention in 2014, when leaders of the association, together with representatives of the
Global Association of Somali Youth in Uganda (GASYU), a student organisation,
accused the First Secretary of the Somali Embassy in Kampala of nepotism and embezzle-
ment of funds raised among elders to support a Somali woman charged of terrorism by the
Ugandan police. The dispute was brought to court and ended with the recall of the oﬃcial
to Somalia.60 One year later, SCAU chairperson was accused of charging Somali refugees a
fee to help them register.61 This inﬁghting to represent Somali interests and control access
to Ugandan authorities intensiﬁed as the Somali population in Uganda increased and
diversiﬁed.
‘Wait and see’
The new law attracted Somalis arriving as refugees from Kenya and re-applying for refugee
status upon reaching the Ugandan border.62 Somali entrepreneurs from Somalia and the
diaspora used Uganda as a regional foothold. After the election of Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud as president on 10 September 2012, Uganda became the ﬁrst country since
1991 to accept the Somali blue passport at its borders. The document was issued either
in the Somali capital or at the Somali Embassy in Kampala. On July 2013, Air Uganda
began operating between Entebbe and Mogadishu, becoming the second national airline
– after Turkish Airlines – to re-establish direct ﬂights to and from the Somali capital.63
This new route provided an alternative to the one from Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta
Airport, served by six Eastern African companies and several erratic and pricey charter
ﬂights, all with a bad reputation for safety,64 and to the intimidating (to many Somalis)
Kenyan passport control oﬃcers. Air Uganda ﬂights soon became very popular among
many in the diaspora, now keener to travel to Mogadishu for the ﬁrst time in many
years via Uganda, often to visit relatives, check on family properties and scout for business
opportunities as improved security and growing economic expectations started to fuel a
building boom across Mogadishu.65 Yet, as the situation on the ground remained volatile,
most Somali businessmen were still reluctant to move back permanently to Somalia with
their families.
The greater ease of travel back and forth between Entebbe and Mogadishu beneﬁted
Somalis based in Kenya, who were able to travel to Uganda as refugees, to Somalia as
Somali citizens and then cross the border back into Kenya. When re-entering Kenya
became more diﬃcult, some decided to resettle in Kampala with their families. New
shops and venues were established in Kisenyi. A restaurant such as the New Maka
guest house recreated in Kampala’s Little Mogadishu the ambiance of Nairobi’s Eastleigh,
serving Somali delicacies like camel meat and milk to an almost completely Somali clien-
tele. Here it was possible to meet refugees such as Hussein,66 a Somali from the Medina
district in Mogadishu who had spent ten years in Nairobi before travelling back to his
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native city again in 2012 on a reconnaissance trip. This was an expensive endeavour:
beside the cost of the travel, it entailed the arrangement of security measures, mostly
with clan members in the country, who provided logistical assistance. Hussein secured
the support of Kenyan Somali relatives and began scouting for real estate opportunities
in Mogadishu. Given his frequent commuting via Entebbe, he decided to move his
entire family to Kisenyi, where they were able to aﬀord a spacious ﬂat at a cheaper rent
than in Eastleigh.
The deteriorating security situation in Kenya provided to many a further reason to con-
sider Kampala as a valid alternative for themselves and their families. In 2012, a spate of
terror attacks hit the Kenya-Somalia borderland areas and Nairobi, in response to the
Kenyan government’s anti-Al Shabaab operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country), fuel-
ling anti-Somali sentiments in the media and the securitisation of refugee policies. Amidst
reports of proﬁling, harassments and extorsion by Kenyan security forces,67 in December
2012 the Kenyan government issued a directive ordering the cessation of all kind of
support to urban refugees and the relocation of Somali refugees to Dadaab. Ahead of
2013 Kenyan elections, concerns of a repeat of the violence that marked the previous elec-
tions in 2007–2008 drove many Somalis from Eastleigh to Kampala to wait and see. The
security crackdown escalated between March and April 2014 following renewed attacks by
Al-Shabaab, with the government launching OperationUsalamaWatch (PeaceWatch). In
a large-scale security sweep across Kenya, the police arrested over 4000 Somalis, restricted
the movement of refugees to camps and began the refoulement of many more back to
Somalia.68 The operation proved ineﬀective to curb violence as attacks by Al-Shabaab con-
tinued, again in June, and then in November and December 2014.
Changing demography, new aspirations
During this period, a growing number of Somali youth (mostly males) arrived from
Nairobi, drawn by a mix of drivers. Perceived police proﬁling was a major push factor.
Most young Somali refugees interviewed for this study had directly experienced at some
point during their stay in Eastleigh harassment by security forces, or knew someone
who had. Often portrayed by the Kenyan media as at risk of radicalisation by Al
Shabaab. young Somalis, and male refugees in particular, were often arrested by the
police or by agents of the General Security Unity (GSU) during security operations,
detained at the Pangani police station, just outside Eastleigh, and allegedly extorted
money. On the pull side, the aﬀordability of higher education opportunities made possible
by the 2006 Refugee Act, capping fees in both public and private universities, was a power-
ful magnet. Somali clusters formed in Kasanga, Mengo Rubego and Kabalagala – areas of
Kampala where the number of private universities have bulged since the late 1990s.
Kampala International University, Cavendish University and St. Lawrence University
gained a signiﬁcant Somali presence. The lower cost of living in Kampala and less likeli-
hood of harassment by the police than in Nairobi were also an incentive for young Somalis
with Kenyan passports and family ties in Kampala. The story of Abdi,69 a 20-year-old born
in Kismayo but with a Kenyan passport, brings to the fore the reputation of Kampala as a
safe, yet dynamic environment in which one would be able to pursue career aspirations.
Abdi moved to Kisenyi in 2013 from Eastleigh where he was working as a clerk in the mat-
tress shop of his uncle, to enrol in Kampala International University. His family had
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already lived in Kisenyi in the 1980s, when his father – a Darood Dulbahante – was
importing sugar from Brazil to Somalia and then across East Africa before moving to
Kenya, where he established a construction company in Thika, a town 40 Km north-
east of Nairobi. Abdi cultivated the aspiration to study medicine and then move to
China, but, after un unpleasant encounter with Kenya police, his father had decided to
have him hosted by relatives to Kampala.
A number of Somali youth from the diaspora were sent by their parents living in North-
ern Europe or the US to relatives in Kampala for dhaqan celis, a term commonly translated
as ‘cultural re-education’.70 In Kinsenyi they could settle among a tight-knit community to
properly learn the language and live a ‘Somali styled life’, cultivating ties with the home-
land and other Somali communities in East Africa and overseas in a safe environment.71
Moreover, as Bakewell and Biniaina point out, Somali youth in Kampala have been active
in ‘expanding their diasporic sphere’72 through student organisations based in the univer-
sities in which Somali students were enrolled. In the Somali context, student associations
have historically had a key role in animating Somali political life since colonial times.73
The ﬁrst student unions in Uganda were established after 2006 by Darood Harti students
with ties to Ugandan Somali businesspeople with the purpose of helping prospective and
current students, mostly from the same clan, to get practical information ahead of reloca-
tion to Uganda and university enrolment and coursework. These unions also proved
crucial to establish connections with Ugandan Somali employers, who would sponsor
special events (such as Student Unions’ Elections and Graduation Parties) and oﬀer scho-
larships to Somali students in need. Sponsorship would also highlight trustworthy stu-
dents to later employ, and create loyalty bonds to groom future political leaders.
Student associations also facilitated access to INGOs operating in Uganda and working
with entrepreneurs and international donors funding programmes in Somalia. The links of
student groups to either the Somali Embassy in Uganda or SCAU also reﬂected the rift
between the two main intermediary Somali organisations in the country, with students
hailing from Hawyie clans linked to the Embassy and students from Darood clans refer-
ring to SCAU.74 Student associations’ elections held in the various Kampala’s universities
were major political events. There, ambitious young refugees would display their oratory
skills and political adroitness by evoking the enduring links with the homeland, exhorting
their fellow students to get an education to rebuild Somalia, and acknowledging the con-
tribution of the sponsors, in front of an audience waving the Somali ﬂag.75 These associ-
ations had also a presence online on Facebook and Whatsapp to stay in touch, exchange
information about education and job opportunities, and claim old and new allegiances,
not only to their Somali identity and to their clans (mostly disguised as support for a
speciﬁc political faction in Somali politics), but also to their own university or a football
team.
Neighbourhood-to-neighbourhood linkages
This article has hitherto charted the transformations of Somali networks in Uganda by
unpacking the adaptation of Somali networks to a changing regional landscape and to a
new refugee framework. The increase of the Somali population in Kisenyi did not drain
people from Eastleigh but rather strengthened the linkages between the two neighbour-
hoods, highlighting the importance of mobility and access to economic opportunities
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for refugees. The remainder of the article focuses on the livelihood strategies deployed
within Uganda and beyond.
Despite sharing the same nickname, Kisenyi still lags behind Eastleigh in terms of size,
added value to the national economy and scale of transnational business going in and out
of the neighbourhood. The only mall in Kisenyi at the time of this study, the Lucky
Complex, a one-story building hosting a few shops selling textiles, housewares and per-
fumes, fades in comparison with Eastleigh’s landmarks. However, the growth of the
Somali community in Uganda indeed increased the demand for goods catering to
Somali-speciﬁc clientele. Neighbourhood-to-neighbourhood trade links76 developed and
were sustained by improvements in transport, telecommunication and ﬁnancial
infrastructures.
The following cases studies clearly illustrate the expansion of cross-local ties between
Eastleigh and Kisenyi. The ﬁrst one refers to Ferdowsa,77 a 25-year-old who arrived to
Kisenyi from Eastleigh after leaving Galkayo in Somalia’s Galmudug region and spending
two years ﬁrst in Dadaab and then in Kakuma with her mother, four sisters and a little
brother. Despite lacking support from the diaspora, she gained the patronage of a
Somali tradeswoman originally from her same area in Somalia, who vouched for her
with a group of camel milk sellers. Borrowing camel milk from them, Ferdowsa started
eking out a living selling tea (camel milk is a key ingredient of Somali tea) to the clients
of the stalls in the Eastleigh’s shopping mall where her patron was based. In the while,
she strengthened her bond with her patron and built a reputation for trustworthiness
and reliability that helped her being accepted into an ayuuto, a Somali self-help group,
from which, after one year, she secured a loan to start a textile business. At the end of
2012, she partnered with a Somali man living in Kampala to sell textiles in Kisenyi. She
received the orders via mobile phone and the payment through hawala, a trust-based
money transfer system, upon shipping the rolls by bus. She decided to relocate to
Kampala in 2014, when she started to trade textiles and a wide range of women clothes
directly from home. She regularly sent money to her mother and siblings, who remained
in Eastleigh, via the mobile money service Safaricom M-Pesa which, in her view, allowed
greater ﬂexibility than hawala.
M-Pesa was the service of choice also for Abdicadir,78 another young refugee from
Baidoa, in Somalia’s Bay region, who gained a reputation among Somali students in
both Kenya and Uganda as very good at ﬁxing electronic devices. Author 1 ﬁrst met Abdi-
cadir in Eastleigh and tracked the route of a laptop that was sent to him for repair on its
way back to its owner in Kisenyi, who, in return, sent the payment to Abdicadir through
M-Pesa. Although, at the time of the ﬁeldwork in 2013, Safaricom did not have a license to
operate in the country as a mobile money operator, the service was managed by some
resourceful Somali students catering to the needs of their fellows. Hassan,79 a Somali
Kenyan student from Eastleigh, had partnered with two university colleagues at the
Kampala International University to perform M-Pesa transactions ‘over the counter’.
His phone number circulated among students, but he could often be found in a phone
repair shop in Kisenyi or on the university premises in Kabalagala. He had a dual SIM
mobile phone, one of which was a Safaricom SIM card. The Safaricom SIM card
allowed him to store Kenyan Shillings in his M-Pesa account. He was handed cash in
Ugandan Shillings (UGX), including a small fee for the transaction, and then calculated
the amount in KSh (the currency in his M-Pesa account) and sent the payment to the
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recipient in Kenya in roaming. At the same time, he could receive payments from Kenya
on his M-Pesa account associated with his Kenyan phone number and then pay the cor-
responding amount, minus a fee, to the recipient. Hassan travelled regularly across the
Kenyan border to top-up his M-Pesa mobile wallets, often bringing back to Uganda
over 100,000 KSh in a handful of SIM cards. This practice required a strong level of inter-
personal trust between him and other students because, in the case of misplaced payment,
there was no way to complain to Safaricom. Often, for many young refugees, these boot-
strap activities were opportunities to gain a reputation for trustworthiness, get noticed by
Somali entrepreneurs and eventually move to more lucrative businesses involving oper-
ations across the region.
A growing network
The availability of trusted workforce is thus one of the factors, along with a greater dia-
spora involvement from the West and Kenya, in terms of capital and knowledge, that
has made possible the development of far-ﬂung Somali business networks centred on
Kampala. Kampala-based entrepreneurs operate in neighbouring countries, such as
Burundi, Zambia, DRC, Rwanda and South Sudan, mostly on logistics and fuel distri-
bution. The Somali dominance of the fuel distribution sector deserves a closer look.
Fuel was initially purchased by clusters of clan-linked entrepreneurs who arranged to
ship alone or through other Somali-run companies from the Persian Gulf to the port of
Mombasa. These deals were typically guaranteed by Somalis with Saudi passports based
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.80 From Mombasa, the fuel was funnelled to Eldoret through
the Western Kenya Pipeline Extension (WKPE)81 and shipped by truck to Uganda,
from where it was sorted to DRC, Rwanda and Burundi. These ﬁrms successfully
pursued strategies of vertical integration, securing the control of the entire fuel supply
chain. The list of Somali companies that dominated the fuel sector included Hashi
Impacts, a Somali-owned company that managed fuel storage depots in Mombasa and
a ﬂeet of trucks; Ainu Shamsi, whose core business was the shipping of reﬁned oil from
the Gulf; and Banoda Petroleum, a freight company that managed an average of 50
trucks a day from the port and a few stations across the country. Fuel suppliers such as
City Oil, Hass and Shire Petroleum became major employers of Somalis working as
truck drivers or in gas stations.
After Independence in 2011, South Sudan became a major destination for Somali logis-
tics companies, keen to tap into the tender opportunities oﬀered by aid organisations and
foreign companies. In the capital Juba and in Bor, Jonglei State, Somali businessmen
invested in construction, transport and trade, using Kisenyi as a transit point for the
trucks coming from Mombasa through Nairobi. Before the outbreak of the civil war in
2013, some Somali-owned ﬁnancial institutions were granted banking licences with the
help of Somali Sudanese businessmen. Mostly supplying fuel, foodstuﬀ and building
material, these ﬁrms were also contractors for road construction and had secured lucrative
contracts with Somali and other African embassies in South Sudan. Somali passport
holders used to ﬂy directly to Kampala to obtain a South Sudanese visa and work as
truck drivers for domestic fuel services and heavy machinery operators. Since only
Kenyan-Somalis with Kenyan driving licenses could drive fuel trucks across the South
Sudanese border, they earned more than Somali passport holders who were limited to
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courier services inside South Sudan. However, the economic opportunities came with
risks. In June 2013, the South Sudanese Central Bank limited the provision of hard cur-
rency to commercial banks, prompting many Somali businessmen to reduce their invest-
ments in the country. The decision was subsequently reversed in November 2013, but,
after violence broke out in South Sudan the following month, the ﬂight of Somali business-
men accelerated. Following death threats and extortion, 500 Somali citizens were repa-
triated to Mogadishu by the Somali government.82 Most Somali entrepreneurs, though,
moved to Kampala, managing their businesses in South Sudan from afar but ready to
return there as soon as the security situation improved.
Conclusion
The expansion of a Somali space in Uganda builds upon linkages tracing back to colonial
times and cultural institutions enshrined in these linkages, and steeped into values of clan-
ship loyalty and obligations. The trajectory of the socio-economic networks that have
developed in this space has been inﬂuenced, on the one hand, by national policies inspired
by the need to cultivate, at the same time, patronage ties and donors’ favours; on the other,
by regional dynamics shaped by historical legacies and geopolitical transformations.
In our article, we have described the mutual inﬂuence of agency, structure and political
authority suggesting that, by leveraging clan relationships and trust-based institutions
such as hawala, Somali entrepreneurs have carved a job market attracting, and eventually
beneﬁtting from, a growing pool of trusted labour, mostly sourced through family and clan
ties. With this article, we sought to bring an empirical contribution to the discussion on
migration networks, and their relation to immigrant entrepreneurship and state-diaspora
interactions in Africa.
While studies on Somali migrations and livelihoods are dominated by an emphasis on
crisis as a major driver of regional displacement, we have stressed the need to consider the
complex set of factors creating not only constraints but also opportunities amidst these
crises. In doing so, we have focussed on organisational structures as they accommodate
to a changing political and economic scenario at a regional level. By calling into question
assumptions on displacement and exile that inform humanitarian policies, we have high-
lighted the critical role of agency for Somali opportunity-seekers against a volatile scen-
ario, with the caveat that some groups are better positioned than others to take
advantage of these opportunities. For instance, during Usalama Watch, moving to
Uganda was not an option for young Somali refugees with no support from the diaspora
or in Kampala to ﬁnd employment or enrol in a university.
A further takeaway from our case study, and with policy implications, is the importance
attached by refugees not only to safety, but also to freedom of movement as both an
expression of agency and a resource to broaden the range of possibilities and explore
alternatives. Despite being among the rights enshrined in the 2006 Refugee Act, this
freedom was largely attributed by the Somali refugees interviewed for this study to the pre-
sident’s personal protection of the Somali population in Uganda. Following the 2010
World Cup bombing, Museveni’s reassurances contributed to strengthening this wide-
spread perception. We have repeatedly stressed the stark contrast in dealing with state
security concerns between the Ugandan synergic approach to the Somali diaspora organ-
isation in the country and the Kenyan scapegoating of the local Somali population,
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emphasising that this divergence is the result not only of diﬀerent histories, geographies
and demographies, but also of Museveni’s peculiar style of government. That this personal
connection to the president is a double-edged sword appeared clear to the Somali partici-
pants to our study. While crediting the presidency for the unwavering support showed so
far for both the peacekeeping eﬀorts in Somalia and Somali grassroots organisations in
Uganda, many Somali interviewees expressed the concern that the end of the Museveni
era, whether through the ballot box or otherwise. could bring to an abrupt end the
current Ugandan sanctuary.
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